Abstract-The concept of k-anonymity has received considerable attention due to the need of several organizations to release microdata without revealing the identity of individuals. Although all previous k-anonymity techniques assume the existence of a public database (P D) that can be used to breach privacy, none utilizes P D during the anonymization process. Specifically, existing generalization algorithms create anonymous tables using only the microdata table (MT ) to be published, independently of the external knowledge available. This omission leads to high information loss. Motivated by this observation, we first introduce the concept of k-join-anonymity (KJA), which permits more effective generalization to reduce the information loss. Briefly, KJA anonymizes a superset of MT , which includes selected records from P D. We propose two methodologies for adapting k-anonymity algorithms to their KJA counterparts. The first generalizes the combination of MT and P D, under the constraint that each group should contain at least 1 tuple of MT (otherwise, the group is useless and discarded). The second anonymizes MT , and then, refines the resulting groups using P D. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of our contributions with an extensive experimental evaluation using real and synthetic data sets.
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INTRODUCTION
N UMEROUS organizations (e.g., medical authorities and government agencies) need to release person-specific data, often called microdata. Although microdata are useful for several tasks (e.g., public health research and demographic analysis), they may unintentionally disclose private information about individuals. Privacy preservation aims at limiting the risk of linking published data to a particular person. Three types of microdata attributes are relevant to privacy preservation: 1) identifiers (IDs); 2) quasi-identifiers (QIs); and 3) sensitive attributes (SAs). IDs (e.g., passport number, social security number, and name) can be used individually to identify a tuple. Clearly, the IDs of all microdata tuples should always be removed in order to protect privacy. QIs (e.g., zip code, gender, and birth date) are attributes that can be combined to act as IDs in the presence of external knowledge. Finally, SAs (e.g., disease, salary, and criminal offence) are fields that should be hidden so that they cannot be associated to specific persons. The process of concealing identity information in microdata is called deidentification. On the other hand, reidentification is the successful linking of a published tuple to an existing person and corresponds to a privacy breach.
In a well-known example, Sweeney [1] was able to determine the medical record of the governor of Massachusetts by joining deidentified patients' data with a voter registration list. Fig. 1 illustrates a simple reidentification case. The microdata table MT has two numeric QIs and a categorical SA. A public database P D contains information about the persons of MT except for D. Moreover, it includes six additional records: G 1 , G 2 (which have identical QI values to G), U, V , X, and Y . The tuples A, B, C, E, and F of MT can be reidentified since their QI value combinations are unique in P D. For instance, by performing an equijoin MT ffl QI 1 ;QI 2 P D, one can infer that the SA of A is v 1 . On the other hand, G cannot be uniquely reidentified since there are three records in P D with identical QI values.
Several concepts have been proposed to achieve privacy preservation. Most database literature has focused on k-anonymity [1] , [2] . Specifically, a table T is k-anonymous if each record is indistinguishable from at least k À 1 other tuples in T with respect to the QI set. For instance, MT in Fig. 1 is 1-anonymous as all combinations of QI values are distinct. The process of generating a k-anonymous table given the original microdata is called k-anonymization. The most common form of k-anonymization is generalization, which involves replacing specific QI values with more general ones.
The output of generalization is an anonymized table AT containing anonymized groups, each including at least k tuples with identical QI values. AT in Fig. 2a is a 3-anonymous version of MT . A tuple (e.g., A) is indistinguishable among the other records (B, C, and D) in its group with respect to the QI attributes, and therefore, its record in MT cannot be precisely determined. Because k-anonymity focuses exclusively on QIs, we omit SA from our illustrations. On the other hand, although the ID is not actually included in MT , we show it in the diagrams for easy reference to the tuples. Fig. 2b contains a visualization of AT , where each group is represented by a rectangle enclosing the QI values of all tuples in the group. Since generalization replaces specific values with ranges, it incurs some inevitable information loss, which can be measured based on various metrics. In general, the usefulness of AT , as well as the effectiveness of a generalization technique, is inversely proportional to its information loss, provided, of course, that k-anonymity is satisfied.
This work is motivated by the observation that although all previous k-anonymity techniques assume the existence of a P D, which can be used to breach privacy, none actually takes P D into account during the anonymization process. This omission leads to unnecessarily high information loss. In Fig. 1 , if k ¼ 3, tuple G 2 MT does not require generalization, as P D already contains two other records (G 1 and G 2 Þ with the same QI values. Based on this fact, we introduce the concept of k-join-anonymity (KJA) to reduce the information loss. Briefly, KJA anonymizes a superset of MT , which includes selected records from P D.
KJA permits the utilization of existing generalization techniques. Specifically, we propose two methodologies for adapting a k-anonymity algorithm kAlgorithm to its KJA counterpart. The first simply applies kAlgorithm directly to the equijoin of MT and P D, under the constraint that each group should contain at least 1 tuple of MT (otherwise, the group is useless and discarded). The second executes kAlgorithm on MT and refines the resulting groups using P D.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys previous work on k-anonymity and related concepts. Section 3 introduces k-join-anonymity. Section 4 describes the methodologies for adapting k-anonymity generalization to KJA. Section 5 contains an extensive experimental evaluation using real and synthetic data sets. Section 6 concludes with directions for future work.
BACKGROUND
Section 2.1 introduces k-anonymity, and Section 2.2 reviews methods and relevant literature. Section 2.3 outlines other related privacy models.
Preliminaries
A microdata table MT contains tuples without ID values that correspond to persons; we assume that only a single tuple per person exists in MT . Note that only the QI set 1 is important for k-anonymity and the SAs can be ignored.
The individuals in MT are drawn from a large population, termed as universe. Definition 1. The set of existing individuals that may appear in MT is called the universe U of MT . The schema of U consists of the unique identifier (ID) and all QI attributes appearing in MT .
The notion of universe may encapsulate several restrictions on various aspects of the data, such as their geographic and temporal scope. Consider, for instance, a geriatric clinic in Massachusetts admitting individuals above 50 years of age that wishes to release patients' microdata. The universe consists of residents of Massachusetts with age attribute greater than 50. As another example, consider a company that releases payroll information about employees who received a raise. In this case, the universe contains all employees of the company.
Given MT , the anonymization process produces an anonymized table (or view) AT that contains all tuples and QI attributes, and preserves as much information as possible compared to the original table MT .
Definition 2.
A table AT is an anonymized instance of MT if: 1) AT has the same QI attributes as MT and 2) there is a oneto-one and onto mapping (bijection) of MT to AT tuples.
The most common method, i.e., mapping, for achieving anonymization is generalization. For numerical QIs, a generalization of a value is a range. For categorical QIs, it is a higher level value in a given hierarchy (e.g., a city name is replaced with a state, or country). Since categorical values can be trivially mapped to an integer domain, we assume only numerical QIs here. A generalized AT tuple is represented as an axis-parallel (hyper) rectangle, called G-box, in the QI space defined by the extent of its QI ranges. We use the term anonymized group, or simply group, to refer to the set of MT tuples that fall within a G-box. The goal of k-anonymity is to hide the identity of individuals by constructing G-boxes that contain at least kMT tuples. To understand the guarantees of k-anonymity, we must first specify the privacy threat and the adversarial knowledge. We consider the reidentification attack [1] , where an attacker's objective is to pinpoint the tuple of a particular 1 . A formal definition of quasi-identifiers and an in-depth study of their interpretation in different settings are contained in [3] . person, termed as victim, in the anonymized table. Adversarial knowledge is described in the following:
Definition 4. The schema of a public database (P D a ) consists of the unique ID and all QI attributes appearing in MT .
Assumption 1 (Precondition).
The attacker has access to a public database P D a which contains at least the victim's tuple.
Using P D a , the attacker identifies the QI values of a victim V and matches them in AT . The next theorem defines the breach probability, i.e., the probability that an attacker reidentifies the victim's tuple. Theorem 1. The breach probability for a victim V in a k-anonymous table AT is p br 1=k independent of the attacker's P D a .
Proof. The victim V falls inside at least one G-box g in AT .
Since AT is k-anonymous, g consists of jgj ! k identical generalized MT tuples. Thus, p br 1=jgj 1=k. t u
Various metrics have been proposed to quantify the information loss incurred by anonymization. According to the discernability metric (DM) [4] , each MT record is assigned a penalty equal to the cardinality of its anonymized group. The DM of AT is defined as the sum of penalties of all MT tuples. According to the normalized certainty penalty (NCP) [5] , the information loss for a record is equal to the perimeter of its G-box. The NCP of the AT is defined as the sum of the information loss for every MT record. For instance, the NCP of AT in Fig. 2 is 62, i.e., 8 Á 4 for g 1 and 10 Á 3 for g 2 .
k-Anonymity Methods
There are various forms of generalization. In global recoding, a particular attribute value in a domain must be mapped to the same range for all records. In local recoding, different value mappings can be chosen across different anonymized groups. The generalization process can also be classified into single-dimensional, where mapping is performed for each attribute individually, and multidimensional, which maps the Cartesian product of multiple attributes.
Optimal algorithms for single-dimensional generalization using global recoding appear in [4] and [6] . Mondrian [7] is a multidimensional, local recoding technique. Xu et al. [5] propose TopDown, a local recoding method based on clustering. Another anonymization technique that uses clustering is proposed in [8] . Meyerson and Williams [9] and Aggarwal et al. [10] present theoretical results on the complexity of generalization. Aggarwal [11] studies the effect of the number of QI attributes on the information loss and concludes that k-anonymity suffers from the curse of dimensionality.
In the sequel, we describe in detail the Mondrian and TopDown generalization algorithms, which we adapt to KJA in Section 4. Mondrian [7] constructs QI groups than contain from k up to 2k À 1 tuples (when all QI values present in MT are distinct), following a strategy similar to the KD-tree space partitioning [12] . In particular, starting with all MT records, it splits the d-dimensional space (defined by the d QI attributes) into two partitions of equal cardinality. The first split is performed along the first dimension (i.e., quasi-identifier QI 1 Þ, according to the median QI 1 value in MT . Each of the resulting groups is further divided into two halves according to the second dimension. Partitioning proceeds recursively, choosing the splitting dimension in a round-robin fashion among QI attributes. Mondrian terminates when each group contains fewer than 2k records. The resulting space partition is the anonymous version of MT to be published. Fig. 3 demonstrates 3-anonymization with Mondrian, assuming that MT contains records A; . . . ; M and has two quasi-identifiers. The horizontal axis corresponds to QI 1 , and the vertical to QI 2 . The first split is performed on the horizontal axis, according to the QI 1 value of C. The left (right) half of the space contains 6 (7) MT tuples (i.e., exceeding 2k À 1 ¼ 5), and it is divided into two groups according to the QI 2 value of record A (of record F Þ. Since each resulting group has fewer than 5 tuples, splitting terminates. The anonymized version AT of MT consists of the four shaded minimum bounding boxes (MBBs), each representing an anonymized group.
TopDown [5] is a recursive clustering algorithm. Specifically, it starts with the entire MT and progressively builds tighter clusters with fewer points. Fig. 4 demonstrates the steps of TopDown on the MT tuples of Fig. 3 . Initially, the algorithm finds the 2 tuples that if included in the same anonymized group, they would result in the largest perimeter. In our example, this first step retrieves G and E. Next, TopDown considers the remaining records in random order, and groups them together with either G or E; a considered tuple is inserted to the group where it causes the smallest NCP increase. In Fig. 4a , assume that record A is processed first. It is included in G's cluster, because if grouped with E, it would lead to a rectangle with larger perimeter. Similarly, if C (HÞ is the second tuple, it is grouped with E (with G and AÞ. After the first pass, all records belong to either group. The procedure is repeated recursively within each cluster, until all groups have no more than k tuples. After this step, the majority of the groups have cardinality below k. To fulfill the k-anonymity requirement, undersized groups are merged with neighboring ones according to some heuristics, aiming at a small NCP. The shaded MBBs in Fig. 4b correspond to four anonymized groups in our example.
Related Concepts
Although k-anonymity hides the tuple of an individual among others, it fails to conceal its sensitive information. For example, when all k tuples in the group of victim V have the same disease, an attacker can determine V 's disease with 100 percent probability. For this reason, various alternative anonymization methods were proposed. The most widely used is l-diversity. A table is l-diverse if each anonymized group contains at least l well-represented 2 SA values [13] . Existing k-anonymity algorithms can be extended to capture l-diversity. For instance, when Mondrian splits a group, it has to ensure that each partition satisfies l-diversity. Otherwise, it must abandon the split (or choose another split axis). Xiao and Tao [14] follow a different approach that publishes the original QIs and SAs in different tables so that l-diversity is preserved without the need for generalization (however, k-anonymity is fully compromised). A similar method is used in [15] for improving the accuracy of aggregate search. Two recent works study the republication of data. In particular, Byun et al. [16] discuss preservation of l-diversity when new tuples appear in the MT . Xiao and Tao [17] also study deletions of MT tuples.
The concept of t-closeness [18] requires that the distribution of SA values in each QI group is analogous to the distribution of the entire data set. Knowledge of the inner mechanisms of the anonymization algorithm can result in privacy breaches as shown in [19] . The authors introduce the concept of m-confidentiality that prevents such attacks. A broader, compared to l-diversity, model for capturing background knowledge and the related ðc; kÞ-safety notion are discussed in [20] . Rastogi et al. [21] present a theoretical study of the privacy-utility trade-off inherent in anonymization. Ghinita et al. [22] propose fast algorithms for achieving k-anonymity and l-diversity. The concept of k m -anonymity [23] captures the existence of multiple records per person in the microdata.
Given a known universe U, the presence attack tries to determine if an individual from U appears in the microdata. For example, consider a penitentiary that releases a list of its inmates. In this scenario, discovering whether someone has been imprisoned constitutes a privacy breach. Although k-anonymity can protect from these attacks, it offers privacy guarantees that can vary considerably among the MT tuples. On the other hand, -presence [24] is designed to ensure uniform breach probability for all individuals in MT .
3 k-JOIN-ANONYMITY Section 3.1 formally introduces KJA and presents the underlying assumptions. Section 3.2 extends KJA to handle sensitive attributes, and Section 3.3 investigates the utility of the released data. Table 1 presents frequently used notations.
Definitions and Assumptions
The goal of k-join-anonymity is to provide the same privacy guarantees with k-anonymity incurring, however, less information loss. To achieve this, it shrinks the G-boxes using public knowledge about universe (U) tuples. In some applications, the entire U is available to the publisher, e.g., as in the company payroll example. However, in most practical cases, knowing every person in the universe is not feasible.
Assumption 2. The publisher possesses a public database P D p , which is a subset of the universe.
Note that P D p should contain at least the QI attributes of MT . Extra attributes in P D p are discarded. A P D p that does not include all QIs is useless for KJA. The anonymization process uses information from MT and P D p . Let JT þ denote the full outer join table , where MT þ corresponds to the microdata augmented with the ID attribute. JT refers to the join table without the ID and contains tuples that appear: 1) in both P D p and MT ; 2) in P D p but not in MT ; and 3) in MT but not in P D p . The main difference of KJA from previous k-anonymity formulations is that an MT record may be anonymized/grouped with any JT tuple, as opposed to being restricted to MT records. Note that not all P D p tuples may be needed during the anonymization process. On the other hand, all MT records must be anonymized. We refer to a subset of JT , which contains all MT tuples, as proper.
Definition 5.
A table JAT is a join-anonymized instance of MT if: 1) JAT has the same QI attributes as MT and 2) there is a one-to-one and onto mapping (bijection) from a proper subset of JT to JAT tuples.
Similar to k-anonymity, KJA uses generalization as the mapping function and enforces the following condition: When the publisher has no knowledge regarding additional U tuples, i.e., P D p is empty, JT ¼ MT , and thus, KJA reduces to conventional k-anonymity. Fig. 5a illustrates a 3-join-anonymous table JAT using the MT and P D p in Fig. 1 ; Fig. 5b visualizes the resulting G-boxes. Comparing JAT with AT , note that group g 1 of AT (Fig. 2b) is partitioned into two smaller ones in JAT , g , using Y , G 1 and G 2 . Theorem 2. The breach probability for a victim V in a k-joinanonymous table JAT is p br 1=k independent of the attacker's P D a .
Proof. The victim V falls inside at least one G-box g in JAT .
Since JAT is k-join-anonymous, g contains jgj ! k identical generalized JT tuples (from either MT or P D p ). Given that the attacker cannot distinguish among them, p br 1=jgj 1=k. t u
We emphasize that KJA does not include artificial tuples in the anonymization process. The reason is to protect from presence attacks [24] . In this setting, the attacker is aware of the entire universe, P D a ¼ U, but does not know which individuals from U appear in the microdata. Her/his goal is to collect information regarding the presence of the victim V in MT . For example, consider an attacker that wishes to find out if V has been hospitalized by examining an MT containing patients' records. If we allow artificial tuples, it is possible that the publisher anonymizes V to a group g using k À 1 non-U records. Since the attacker knows the entire universe, she/he can perform a successful presence attack, i.e., disqualify all k À 1 artificial tuples and ascertain that V appears in MT .
A similar breach happens when the attacker purposely publishes a database with census data, among which she/ he includes fake tuples of nonexisting individuals or erroneous (i.e., purposely modified) information for existing individuals. If this database is included in the anonymization process, the adversary may subsequently disqualify the known fake/erroneous tuples and determine the presence of MT records anonymized with them.
In order to satisfy Assumption 2 and prevent presence attacks, the publisher must: 1) incorporate into P D p only databases published by trusted authorities (such as government offices) and 2) cross check the accuracy of P D p tuples from multiple external databases. To prevent tampering with these data by third parties (e.g., adversaries gaining access to the trusted authorities' databases or interfering with the data transfer channel), the owner of P D p may deploy authenticity verification methods such as [25] , [26] .
Sensitive Information
When the microdata contain sensitive attributes, KJA should protect from attribute disclosures [13] as well. According to this attack model, the adversary wishes to determine the sensitive information associated with the victim. This section shows that KJA is equivalent to traditional k-anonymity for preventing attribute disclosure. Note that k-anonymity offers nonuniform breach probability to tuples for this type of attack; in fact, this observation was the motivation for the l-diversity concept [13] . Furthermore, for a particular victim, different k-anonymous tables may offer different guarantees. Below, we show that given a k-anonymous table AT , one can construct a k-joinanonymous JAT such that AT and JAT provide the same level of protection to each tuple.
Since a k-join-anonymous table, JAT , contains P D p tuples with no sensitive information, a challenging task is to handle SA attributes in a manner that does not differentiate between MT and non-MT records. The naive solution of assigning SA values to non-MT tuples is unacceptable for two reasons. First, there is no obvious way to perform this assignment. Second, this increases the perceived cardinality of SA values in the microdata, reducing the accuracy and utility of the released data. For instance, an analyst may mistakenly conclude that more cancer patients exist than in reality. In the following, we present an approach that only uses the SA values present in the microdata.
To aid the presentation, we introduce the concept of sensitive groups. Initially, consider a k-anonymous table AT . All tuples within a sensitive group sg i have the same multiset of SA values, which is represented in a separate table SI similar to Anatomy [14] . More specifically, SI contains tuples hsg i ; v j i associating SA value v j to sg i . In addition, the anonymized table includes an attribute SG that identifies the tuple's sensitive group. Fig. 6 shows the table AT of Fig. 2a augmented with SG and the corresponding SI. Tuples A, B, C, and D form sg 1 and are linked to one of the fv 1 ; v 1 ; v 2 ; v 2 g SA values. Note that in conventional kanonymity, unlike KJA, sensitive and anonymized groups coincide, e.g., sg 1 and g 1 refer to the same tuples.
Given an AT , we can construct a KJA table JAT with the following properties: 1) The G-box for each anonymized group g 0 j of JAT is contained within the G-box of some g i of AT , i.e., g i is a generalization of g 0 j . 2) All tuples in g 0 j (including those from P D p not in MT ) belong to the same sensitive group as those in g i , i.e., SI is common for AT and JAT . Therefore, an MT tuple in JAT is linked to the same SA values as in AT . The Refinement method, described in Section 4, produces a JAT that explicitly satisfies the first property; attaining that the second is trivial. to SA values, as they all belong to the same sensitive group sg 1 , satisfying the second property. Observe that non-MT tuples (e.g., U) are still indistinguishable from MT tuples (e.g., A and B). Independently of the released table (AT or JAT ), the attacker reaches the same conclusion regarding the SA value for any of the A, B, C, and D tuples, i.e., it is either v 1 or v 2 .
Utility
To evaluate the utility of the anonymized table, we adapt the two information loss metrics discussed in Section 2: DM [4] and NCP [5] . Let V be an MT record and g be its corresponding G-box in JAT . DM penalizes V based on the number of MT records inside g. On the other hand, NCP penalizes V by the (normalized) perimeter of g. As an example, consider the anonymized tables AT and JAT depicted in Figs. 2b and 5b. Note that in JAT , the NCP for G 2 g 0 4 is 0 and the DM is 1, i.e., the minimum possible. The total NCP for JAT is 2 Á 4 þ 2 Á 4 þ 2 Á 4 þ 1 Á 0 ¼ 32, whereas for AT is 62. Similarly, the total DM for JAT is 2 Á 2 þ 2 Á 2 þ 2 Á 2 þ 1 Á 1 ¼ 13 and for AT is 25. Therefore, JAT incurs less information loss compared to AT according to DM (fewer MT tuples per group) and NCP (smaller group perimeter). Note that when P D p ¼ , both KJA information loss metrics are equivalent to their counterparts for conventional k-anonymity. Next, we show how these metrics relate to typical mining tasks.
Consider the following aggregate query: find out the number of MT individuals within a range of the QI space. Fig. 7 illustrates the range ½0; 4 Â ð2; 4 as the shaded area containing two MT tuples, C and D. Given an anonymized table, the query can only be approximately answered. Processing for a k-anonymous table AT proceeds as follows: The given range covers 2=3 of g 1 and 1=3 of g 2 . Assuming uniform distribution of MT tuples inside the G-boxes, one can estimate that there are approximately 2=3 Á 4 ¼ 2:66 individuals within g 1 and 1=3 Á 3 ¼ 1 within g 2 . Therefore, based on AT , one deduces that approximately 3.66 individuals satisfy the query range.
On the other hand, query processing on JAT proceeds as follows (note that due to JAT 's tighter groups, the range covers only g Analogous findings hold for more complex aggregate queries, e.g., find the distribution of sensitive values within a range. The correct answer for the query range shown in Fig. 7 is ðv 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 Þ ¼ ð1; 1; 0Þ, since C and D have values v 1 and v 2 , respectively. Using the above reasoning, one obtains the distribution ð5=3; 5=3; 1=3Þ from AT and the correct ð1; 1; 0Þ from JAT and SI. In conclusion, tighter G-boxes, in terms of cardinality (i.e., low DM) and volume (i.e., low NCP), increase the utility of released data in typical microdata analysis scenarios.
KJA ALGORITHMS
KJA requires that each G-box encloses at least k tuples of JT , subject to the constraint that each G-box encloses at least 1 tuple of MT . kAlgorithm denotes a generalization method for k-anonymity such as Mondrian or TopDown. We propose two methodologies for applying kAlgorithm to KJA. The first, termed as Direct, generalizes the entire JT using kAlgorithm. Among the resulting G-boxes, it keeps only the ones that represent some record(s) in MT , and discards the rest. Note that depending on kAlgorithm, the remaining G-boxes may not be tight in which case they are replaced by their MBBs.
The second methodology, called Refinement, is motivated by the fact that Direct makes its first (and thus, more determinative) grouping decisions without taking into account which tuples of JT appear in MT . Intuitively, group formation should consider the distribution of MT records (in the QI space), and then, refine them using nearby external data. Based on the above, Refinement involves the following steps. First, it applies kAlgorithm on MT . Then, for each generalization box created, it performs a range query on JT and invokes kAlgorithm on the retrieved records. This operation generates new G-boxes. Refinement places into JAT the MBBs of the new G-boxes that contain at least one MT tuple. Fig. 8a illustrates the adaptation of Mondrian to KJA using Refinement. We use the MT data set of Fig. 3 (e.g., records A to M), assuming that the P D p contains tuples N to Z, shown as hollow points. First, we execute Mondrian on MT , producing the four partitions shown in Fig. 3 . Then, for each of these partitions, we find all the P D p records falling inside and exploit them to refine the groups of the first round. The bold lines correspond to the original splits and the thinner ones to the second round of splits. The shaded areas in Fig. 8b denote the final G-boxes.
Note that G-boxes without any MT tuple (e.g., the one containing records T , U, V , and W Þ are discarded. Also, in groups with more external tuples than necessary, we ignore some of them so as to minimize the corresponding G-box perimeter, e.g., the group of L, M, Y , and Z (in Fig. 8a ) contains more than k ¼ 3 tuples, and omission of external record Z (in Fig. 8b ) reduces the perimeter, without violating the anonymity constraint or leaving any MT tuple outside. By comparing Figs. 3 and 8b , it can be easily seen that KJA achieves a much lower information loss. According to Direct, Mondrian is executed on the entire JT (tuples A up to ZÞ. During the splitting process, if some partition contains no MT record, it is excluded from consideration. Finally, the MBBs of the resulting G-boxes are inserted into JAT . Fig. 9a exemplifies the incorporation of TopDown in our framework according to Refinement using the MT and P D p in Fig. 8 . First, we execute TopDown on MT (the solid points) and obtain the same boxes (shown with bold lines) as in Fig. 4b . Then, we retrieve from JT all the records falling inside these boxes and reapply TopDown on all data (solid and hollow points). The resulting (shaded) G-boxes form JAT . Note that if there were any boxes without MT tuples, they would be discarded. On the other hand, in the Direct approach, TopDown is applied on the entire JT . Fig. 9b illustrates the returned G-boxes; the ones containing some MT record (shown shaded) are placed into JAT and the remaining ones (e.g., with external tuples N, T , and V ) are discarded.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of the KJA framework using both real and synthetic data sets. The real data set IPUMS [27] contains 2.8 million records with household census information. We form MT and P D p drawing random samples from the original data set. For convenience, we assume that P D p contains all MT tuples, and hence, JT ¼ P D p . The cardinality jMT j of the MT table is fixed to 10K. The ratio jP D p j=jMT j varies from 1 to 100, resulting in a P D p of 10K to 1M tuples. We extract six QI attributes from IPUMS and vary the dimensionality d of the QI space from 2 up to 6, selecting the d first attributes in the order depicted in Table 2 . The anonymity requirement k ranges between 5 and 500. The synthetic data set, termed as UNI, has QI values uniformly distributed in ½0; 1.
Our experiments compare KJA versions of Mondrian and TopDown to their conventional (i.e., k-anonymity) counterparts in terms of information loss and processing time. We use the modified NCP and DM metrics, defined in Section 3.3, to quantify information loss. Furthermore, we consider data analysis scenarios involving range-count queries: find out how many MT tuples satisfy a given range R in the QI space. MondrianDIR (TopDownDIR) and MondrianREF (TopDownREF) refer to the Direct and Refinement KJA variants of Mondrian (TopDown). In each diagram, we vary one parameter (jP D p j=jMT j, k, d, or jRj), while setting the remaining ones to their default values. The tested ranges and default values for these parameters are shown in Table 3 . The reported results correspond to the average of values obtained through five executions with different (random) selections of MT and P D p records. All experiments were performed using a 2.4 GHz Core 2 Duo CPU.
Figs. 10 and 11 measure NCP and DM, respectively, using Mondrian and the IPUMS data set. Figs. 10a and 11a focus on the effect of jP D p j=jMT j. The information loss of conventional Mondrian is constant, as it does not take into account P D p . On the other hand, KJA improves as the size of P D p increases. This is expected, since the space around the microdata becomes denser with P D p tuples, enabling KJA to create smaller G-boxes (and thus, to reduce the NCP). The DM drops because each G-box contains more external records on average, and hence, fewer MT tuples. When jP D p j=jMT j ¼ 100, for instance, MondrianDIR has 3.04 times lower NCP than Mondrian and 14.35 times lower DM. In the same setting, MondrianREF reduces NCP and DM by 2.15 and 4.96 times, respectively. Regarding the comparison between the KJA methods, MondrianDIR performs better than MondrianREF for both metrics. The quality of the produced JAT is largely determined by the initial splitting decisions of Mondrian. For a skewed data set, like IPUMS, having knowledge of the entire P D p beforehand is helpful for evenly distributing P D p tuples during splits. Thus, MondrianDIR leads to more balanced G-boxes (in terms of size and the ratio of microdata to external tuples) than MondrianREF.
Figs. 10b and 11b plot the information loss as function of
. A stricter anonymity requirement naturally leads to a higher information loss for all algorithms. The G-boxes are enlarged to cover the necessary number of tuples, leading to higher NCP. In turn, larger G-boxes contain more MT tuples, i.e., each microdata record is anonymized together with more MT tuples on average, incurring a higher DM. We clarify that in Fig. 11b , the information loss of both KJA variants does increase with k, but the difference is not obvious because the chart contains large DM values for Mondrian; their DM for k ¼ 500 is around six times higher than for k ¼ 5.
Figs. 10c and 11c examine the effect of the number of quasiidentifiers d on the information loss (jP D p j=jMT j ¼ 100, k ¼ 50). Let us first consider NCP in Fig. 10c . The space becomes sparser in higher dimensions, thus necessitating larger G-boxes to cover the required number of records. Hence, the performance of all three methods deteriorates, in accordance with the study of [11] . On the other hand, DM is not sensitive to d because the final G-boxes of Mondrian (in its conventional or KJA version) contain approximately the same number of MT and P D p records regardless of d (although the perimeter of G-boxes increases with d).
Figs. 12 and 13 repeat the above set of experiments using TopDown. Figs. 12a and 13a show that the information loss decreases fast as jP D p j=jMT j grows. For jP D p j=jMT j ¼ 100, TopDownDIR and TopDownREF achieve 2.1 (2.22) and 3.51 (3.4) lower NCP (DM) than TopDown, respectively. Unlike Mondrian (Figs. 10a and 11a) , the Refinement version of TopDown outperforms the Direct one because TopDown's clustering process is more flexible than the splits of Mondrian, dealing better with the skewness of IPUMS.
Figs. 12b and 13b plot the information loss for the TopDown variants versus k. The performance of all methods deteriorates with k, for the reasons explained in the context in Figs. 10b and 11b . The effect of the QI-space dimensionality is shown in Figs. 12c and 13c . The NCP increases with d, while DM does not follow some particular trend. The DM fluctuations in Fig. 13c are more evident than for Mondrian (Fig. 11c) because TopDown, due to its randomized nature, is more sensitive to the relative skewness among the QIs. , where actual is the correct answer and estimate is the approximate value computed from the anonymous Figs. 10a and 11a , Refinement quickly reduces this value as more public tuples are incorporated in the anonymization process. In particular, for the default setting (jP D p j=jMT j ¼ 100), MondrianREF produces almost 2.71 times more accurate estimates (ARE 7.7). Fig. 14b shows the average relative error while varying k. As the anonymity requirement increases, the accuracy of range-aggregate queries decreases because G-boxes become larger. MondrianREF consistently produces tighter G-boxes as shown in Figs. 10b and 11b and significantly reduces the ARE. For instance, the reduction is 1.88-fold (ARE 2.7 versus 5.1) when k ¼ 5, and becomes 3.24-fold for k ¼ 500 (ARE 37.6 versus 11.6). Fig. 14c studies the effect of the range size jRj. In all values examined, MondrianREF provides two up to four times more accurate query answers than Mondrian. Note that the estimation accuracy increases with jRj because for low jRj values, the range covers only a few tuples; consequently, even small absolute discrepancies lead to large relative errors. Fig. 15 repeats the above setup for TopDown and shows similar trends. In the default setting, TopDownREF achieves a 1.74-fold improvement in accuracy over TopDown (ARE 3.5 versus 6.1); note that both methods are more accurate than Mondrian or MondrianREF. An interesting observation in Fig. 15b is that the accuracy of TopDown variants decreases quickly as the anonymization requirement increases. For instance, TopDown (TopDownREF) has ARE 0.41 (0.18) when k ¼ 5, but ARE 51.2 (30.8) when k ¼ 500. Nonetheless, in all cases, KJA reduces the average relative error with an improvement factor that ranges from 1.66 up to 3.04.
Next, we measure the information loss using NCP on the uniform data sets; DM charts demonstrate similar trends and are omitted. Figs. 16 and 17 investigate the effectiveness of KJA using Mondrian and TopDown, respectively. In general, KJA exhibits analogous behavior to that on IPUMS, with an interesting difference. The two KJA variants of Mondrian produce JAT s with almost identical information loss (Fig. 16) . Similarly, the margin between TopDownREF and TopDownDIR (Fig. 17) is very narrow compared to IPUMS (Fig. 12) . The reason for the above observations is that the uniform distribution of the data reduces the effect of the different grouping decisions followed by the Direct and Refinement variants of the algorithms.
So far, our empirical study has centered on the information loss and estimation accuracy. Figs. 18 and 19 , on the other hand, illustrate the processing time for Mondrian and TopDown, respectively, versus jP D p j=jMT j, k, and d. As shown in Figs. 18a and 19a , the running time of both KJA variants increases with jP D p j=jMT j (since they process more P D p tuples), whereas, as expected, that of the conventional generalization techniques is constant. MondrianREF is about two times slower than MondrianDIR because it performs multiple range queries on the external database. However, the TopDown variants require roughly the same time. TopDown executes in two steps: 1) splitting and 2) merging groups. The running time is dominated by the latter step, as it requires joining multiple small groups. This cost is similar for both TopDownDIR and TopDownREF. Although KJA algorithms are more expensive than their conventional counterparts, their execution time never exceeds a few minutes, which is a reasonable cost given that anonymization is a one-time effort.
Figs. 18b and 19b vary k and measure the processing time. The cost of all Mondrian versions decreases with k, since fewer splits are necessary to produce the JAT . The cost of the conventional TopDown also decreases with k, but this is not the case for TopDownREF and TopDownDIR. The splitting step of TopDown is accelerated for large k. The cost of the merging step, on the other hand, increases with the cumulative number of (MT and P D p ) tuples inside the groups. These conflicting factors are responsible for the relatively stable performance of the KJA versions of TopDown.
Figs. 18c and 19c plot the running time versus d. All Mondrian variants are unaffected by d, as the number of performed splits is independent of d. In Fig. 19c , the cost of the conventional TopDown increases with d, because the NCP calculations involved in its clustering strategy become more expensive. For the KJA variants of TopDown, this extra cost is negligible compared to the time spent for range queries, and thus, their total running time is relatively stable.
Summarizing, compared to k-anonymity, KJA reduces the information loss and increases the estimation accuracy. For uniform data sets, Refinement and Direct have similar benefits in terms of information loss. On the other hand, for real-life data sets, Direct seems more suitable for Mondrianbased generalization, whereas Refinement works better with TopDown. Refinement has higher processing cost than Direct due to the multiple range queries it issues.
CONCLUSION
In most practical anonymization scenarios, there exists public knowledge (e.g., voter registration data) that can be used by an attacker to breach privacy. On the other hand, this knowledge can also be exploited to reduce the information loss in the published data. Motivated by this observation, we introduce the concept of KJA and show how existing generalization algorithms can be adopted to take into account external databases. We demonstrate the effectiveness of KJA through an extensive experimental evaluation, using real and synthetic data sets.
An interesting direction for future work is to apply the general concept of exploiting external knowledge to alternative forms of deidentification. For instance, since some k-anonymity algorithms (e.g., Mondrian) can be easily adapted to capture l-diversity, we expect that the availability of external information will also be beneficial in this case. Additionally, we plan to investigate the issue of updates in MT and P D. Assume that after the initial release of AT , the MT is modified and a new AT must be published. Meanwhile, the P D may have also been updated. A challenging issue is to incrementally update the AT , without compromising the privacy of MT or the utility of AT .
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